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PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY, ENFORCEMENT AND SMUGGLING: 
A STOCHASTIC MODEL 
ABSTRACT 
This paper merges the existing smuggling literature with the literature 
concerning competitive firm behavior under uncertainty. A stochastic, joint 
product, model of smuggling is developed. The model introduces production 
uncertainty, generated by enforcement activity, into a Pitt (1981) type of 
smuggling production function. This modelling technique allows the trade 
pattern and welfare results which evolve under smuggling with uncertainty to 
be compared to smuggling in a world of certainty. It is demonstrated that 
mere presence of uncertainty increases the real resource cost associated with 
smuggling, reduces legal and illegal trade, and welfare, when compared to 
smuggling in a world of certainty. 
PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY, ENFORCEMENT AND SMUGGLING: 
A STOCHASTIC MODEL 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature on illegal transactions in international trade has 
expanded rapidly since the publication of the seminal article by Bhagwati and 
Hansen (1973) . The smuggling literature can be categorized as presenting 
either: 1) deterministic models; or 2) stochastic models. 
The model presented in this paper is a joint product stochastic model of 
smuggling. Joint product smuggling was first considered by Pitt (1981) . 
Pitt's model is deterministic and was the first to demonstrate that legal and 
illegal trade could coexist with the empirically valid phenomena of price 
disparity. Martin and Panagariya (1984) were the first to formally 
incorporate uncertainty into a model of joint product smuggling.1 They 
introduce uncertainty through the use of a linear probability function, 
applied externally to the smuggling firm's profit function. Martin and 
Panagariya were able to reproduce the welfare results of Bhagwati and Hansen, 
as well as those produced by Pitt, depending on the assumptions imposed. 
Another important contribution of their paper was the first explicit 
examination of the effects enforcement has on smuggling and welfare. 
This paper extends the literature on smuggling under uncertainty by 
transforming Pitt's model of smuggling into a stochastic model of smuggling in 
the tradition of Sandmo (1971) , Batra and Ullah (1974) , and Ratti and Ullah 
(1976) . Uncertainty is introduced in the smuggling production function via a 
1 Other papers employing stochastic models include, Scholer (1989), Sheikh (1989), Thursby 
(1991 ), Fausti (1992). However, all of these papers fail to provide a link between smuggling under 
uncertainty with the literature on the economic consequences of the competitive firm operating 
in a world of uncertainty. 
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random variable, the smuggling success rate. The smuggling success rate is 
assumed to be dependent on the level of enforcement effort against smuggling. 
The stochastic model presented in this paper allows an analysis of how 
uncertainty affects the smuggling firm's input demand and output supply 
decisions. Unlike the earlier papers on smuggling under uncertainty, the 
firm's input demand and output supply decisions and subsequent welfare 
consequences can be compared to smuggling in a world of certainty. The 
stochastic modelling techniques applied in the analysis of smuggling for this 
paper bridges the gap between the smuggling literature and the literature on 
"the competitive firm under uncertainty". 
II. PITT'S MODEL OF SMUGGLING 
Pitt's model lends itself to the introduction of uncertainty through his 
smuggling production function. Pitt's original trade pattern and welfare 
results will be compared to the results derived in the uncertainty model, to 
determine the economic effects of uncertainty in the production of a joint­
product export. 
Pitt's basic model represents the small country case with fixed terms of 
trade. The country produces two traded goods, (X) and (M) , an exportable and 
importable, respectively, with primary factors in perfect competition. 
Production and trade are carried out by identical firms. Legal and illegal 
trade in exports is carried out by the same firm. All firms smuggle in the 
Pitt model and the law of one price holds in the domestic economy. It is 
assumed each firm can trade illegally according to "Pitt's smuggling 
function", 
s* = G(L,S). (1) 
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The term (S*) is the quantity of good (X) successfully smuggled, (L) is 
the quantity of good (X) legally traded and (S) is the quantity of good (X) 
used as an input into smuggling activity. The function (G) is strictly 
concave and a twice differentiable linear homogenous function. The function 
(G) is also assumed to have the following properties: 
GL � 0, 
1 � Gs � 0, 
s - s• � o. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Assumption (2) states that the marginal product of legal trade used in 
smuggling is non-negative. Assumption (3) states that a unit increase in the 
smuggling input (S) results in a positive, but less than or equal to, unit 
increase in actual ex-post smuggling. Assumption (4) prohibits the cost of 
smuggling from being negative. The difference between ex-ante smuggling (S) 
and ex-post smuggling, s*, is the real resource cost or the confiscation cost 
of smuggling or both. 
Maximization of smuggler's profits is given by equation (5), 
� - pf•G(L,S) + pf•(l-t)•L - P8 •(L+S) 
where [Pf•G(L,S)] represents successful smuggling revenues and pf•(l-t)•L 
represents revenues for legal trade and P8•(L+S) represents the domestic 
production cost of exports. The first order profit maximization conditions, 
a�/oL, a�/as, are respectively, 
pf• GL + pf• (1- t) pS ' 
(5) 
(6) 
pf .Gs (7) 
The term (Pf), is the fixed international terms of trade and (t) is the ad 
valorem tax rate. First order conditions (6) and (7) state that the marginal 
cost of an additional unit of tradeable will just equal its revenue in trade, 
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be it legal or illegal trade. An additional unit of legal trade will result 
in additional legal revenue pf ·(l-t) and additional smuggling revenue pf .CL· 
Under the assumption of perfect competition, firms will earn zero economic 
profits because the revenue from all foreign trade is just equal to the 
domestic cost of exports. Setting equation (5) equal to zero and solving for 
pS yields an expression for the long-run equilibrium domestic price ratio as a 
weighted average of all export trade, 
ps - [Pf •S* /(L+S)] + [Pf •(l-t)·L /(L+S)]. (8) 
Equation (8) is equivalent to Pitt's expression for the equilibrium domestic 
price ratio in his model. Examining eq.8, a price differential is found when 
comparing pS to pf(l-t). Pitt calls this empirically valid price 
differential, price disparity. 
Pitt's smuggling production function, eq. l, embodies a technology that 
requires the use of both legal and illegal goods as inputs to produce a 
successfully smuggled good as part of a unit of a joint product tradeable. 
The smuggling technology requires that a portion of the illegal good (input) 
will be used up during the transformation process. According to Pitt, during 
the smuggling process some of the smuggling input is lost to confiscation or 
some is lost to the real resource cost in excess of legal trade associated 
with smuggling or both. Therefore, the successfully smuggled good (output) is 
less than the illegal input. This "using up" of a portion of the illegal 
input due to an excessive real resource cost is referred to as the Samuelson 
"melting ice effect", by Bhagwati and Hansen.2 In the Pitt model, if there is 
a melting ice effect, then smuggling has an ambiguous welfare effect as 
2 See Samuelson's 1954 paper on trade impediments and transportation costs. 
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compared to the non-smuggling situation. If the portion of illegal input lost 
during the smuggling process is the result of confiscation by enforcement 
activity, then smuggling has a strictly positive welfare effect. 
III. SMUGGLING TECHNOLOGY 
The purpose of the smuggling technology is to avoid detection so that 
illegal exports are successfully smuggled out of the country and delivered to 
the world market as (S*). As in Pitt's model, it is assumed that the 
smuggling production function embodies a melting ice effect due to a real 
resource cost associated with the smuggling technology. The smuggling 
technology requires smugglers to engage in evasion tactics. 3 In contrast to 
Pitt's model, the smuggling production function used in this paper is assumed 
not to embody the confiscation cost associated with smuggling. It is also 
assumed, that if smugglers do not engage in evasion tactics, then the 
probability of detection is one. 
The smuggling technology embodied in the smuggler's production function, 
however, does not completely insulate the smuggler from detection and 
confiscation. Thus, the contribution of the smuggling input (S) to successful 
smuggling (S*) during the transformation process via the smuggling technology 
is reduced by enforcement effort. 
Assume the smuggling production function defined in equation (1) now 
embodies the smuggling technology described above. Define the parameter (u), 
as the smuggling success rate, having a value between zero and one. Let S1, 
3 The real resource cost can be due to special packing cost necessary to hide smuggled goods 
or the excess transportation costs of shipping unreported production out of the country via 
clandestine ports. 
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be defined as the amount of smuggling input that avoids confiscation during 
the smuggling (production) process. Define the relationship between S and S1 
as follows, 
This assumption allows the replacement of S with S1 in the smuggling 
production function, 
s* - G(L,S1 ). 
(9) 
(10) 
If the smuggling success rate is equivalent in equations 1 and 10, then this 
modification will not alter Pitt's equilibrium domestic price ratio, eq.8. 
This implies that separating the real resource cost from the confiscation cost 
of smuggling has no effect on s*. The first order conditions (FOC) are 
derived with the modification, 
� - pf•G(L,S1 ) + pf•(l-t)•L - P8•(L+S), 
pf .GL + pf•(l-t) - pS 
pf .G81 ·dS
1/dS - P8 , where dS1/dS-u and 
s > s1 > s*. 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
The modified smuggling production function now only generates the real 
resource effect described in Pitt's paper. The implications of condition 14 
are: 1) the confiscation cost associated with smuggling is equal to S-S1 or 
S•(l-u); 2) the real resource cost associated with smuggling is equal to S1 -
s*; and 3) an increase in u, increases the firms profit, i.e., 
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IV. UNCERTAINTY IN THE SMUGGLING PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
In the previous section, the real resource cost component and the 
confiscation cost component of smuggling were separated by redefining the 
technology of smuggling and introducing the smuggling success rate (u) into 
the smuggling production process. Employing a variant of a modeling procedure 
developed in a paper by Ratti and Ullah (1976), the smuggling success rate 
will now be defined as a random variable. Define (u) as a strictly positive 
random variable with the variable's density function defined as f(u), 
This modification will make the confiscation cost associated with 
smuggling a random variable, and introduces uncertainty into the smuggling 
production function. The implication is that output (S*), the successfully 
smuggled good, is now a random variable. The incorporation of uncertainty 
necessitates redefining the properties of smuggling production function so 
that it is: 1) a thrice differentiable, concave, non-linear homogenous 
function; 2) the marginal products are positive and declining; and 3) the 
cross partial derivatives are positive.4 The introduction of uncertainty 
into the smuggling production function leads to the first proposition in the 
paper: 
PROPOSITION I: The firm's (expected) output of successful smuggling when 
uncertainty is introduced, ceteris paribus, is less than the firm's output 
under conditions of certainty. 
To establish the above proposition, Jensen•s inequality and the 
definition of expected value are applied to the smuggling production function 
4 The assumption of the cross partial being positive implies legal and illegal inputs are 
complementary. 
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G(L,S1). Defining the expected value of (u) as E(u)-u, where E is the 
expectations operator; certainty in this situation means to replace (u) with 
(u). Then by the Jensen Inequality, 
E[G(L,uS)] < G(L,uS), (16) 
and proposition I is established.5 
An economic implication of the introduction of production uncertainty 
into Pitt's model is that the mere presence of uncertainty, ceteris paribus, 
increases the real resource cost of smuggling as compared to the case where 
the firm is operating in a world of certainty. 
The introduction of uncertainty into the smuggling production function 
requires that the smuggling firm's profit function (eq.11) be redefined in 
terms of utility. It is assumed that the firm's utility function conforms to 
the characteristics of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and the 
third derivative of the utility function exists. Under these assumptions, the 
firm's utility of profit function is, 
(17) 
with U '(•)>O, and u• 2::. 0, depending upon whether the firm is risk preferring, 
.L. 
risk neutral, or a risk averter. 
It is assumed that the firm's goal is to maximize expected utility from 
profit. The first order conditions are, 
oE[ U(w)]/oL - E[ U '(w)•(Pf•GL + pf •(l-t)-P8)] 
oE[ U(w)]/oS - E[ U '(•)·(Pf•G81•u- P
8)] = 0. 
0, (18) 
(19) 
6 The Jensen Inequality states that if a function is concave the following is true: E[h(X)] < 
h(E[X)). The implication for the smuggling technology is that the output of successful smuggling 
s· in an uncertain environment is less than the output of s· if production had taken place with the 
expected value of the random variable S1 , i.e., a certain environment. See Rao (1973, p.58) for 
an explanation of Jensen's inequality. 
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The second order conditions are, 
a2E [U(,r) ] /aL2 - A1 - E [U• (,r) • (Pf •GL + pf . (1-t)-P8)2 + 
pf• GLL • U, ('If) ] < 0' 
a2E [U(,r) ]/aS2 = A2 = E [U• (,r) • (P
f•G81 •u- P
8)2 + 
pf •Gs1s1•u
2 •U'(1r)] < 0, 
a2E [U(1r)]/aLas = B1 = E[U•(,r)•(P
f•GL + pf ,(l-t)-P8)•(Pf•Gs1•U- P
8) 
+ U' (1r) .pf ,u•G1s1 1' 
where it is assumed that, 
A1·A2 - B1
2 ... DET > O. 
V. THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL TRADE. 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
In this section it will be demonstrated that the introduction of 
uncertainty into the Pitt smuggling production function will generate the 
following results: 1) under conditions of uncertainty, the risk averse 
(preferring) firm will engage in less (more) legal and illegal trade than the 
risk neutral firm; and 2) the risk neutral firm will engage in less legal and 
illegal trade than it would under conditions of certainty. 
The analysis begins by rewriting the FOC, eqs. 18 and 19 in the 
following manner, 
E [U'(,r)•(Pf•GL + pf ,(1-t))] = E[U'(1r)]·P8, 
E[U'(1r)•(Pf•G81•u)J = E [U'(1r)]•P8. 
Adopting Horowitz's (1970) alternative way of expressing the FOC, yields 
pf ·E [GL+(l-t)] = P8 - {Pf•Cov [U'(1r), GL+(l-t)] / E [U'(,r)]}, 
and 
pf•E [G81•u] = P
8 - {Pf•Cov[U'(,r), G81•u] / E [U'(1r)]}. 
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(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
From above it is clear that marginal revenue of the joint product is now 
a random variable. Furthermore, the marginal physical product (MPP) and 
marginal value product (MVP) of legal and illegal inputs are also random 
variables. Examining the covariance term in equations 26 and 27, it becomes 
clear that when u•(w) 0, the covariance term is also equal to zero. The 
implication is that the risk neutral firm engages in joint product trade up to 
the point where the marginal cost of domestic production of exports (P8 ) is 
equal to the E[MVP] of legal and illegal inputs. When U•(w) � 0, it will be 
demonstrated that the sign of the covariance term becomes dependent on the 
sign of U•(w). With respect to the covariance term in equation 26, the 
derivatives 
au• (w)/au = U•(w)•Pf•Gs1•S 
and 
(28) 
(29) 
confirms that the sign of the covariance term in equation 26 has the same sign 
as U•(w), since the sign of equation 28 is dependent on U•(w). However, the 
sign of the covariance term in equation 27 can not be ascertained. However, 
it can be demonstrated that when it is assumed that the elasticity of the 
marginal product curve (I) for smuggling input (S1) has an absolute value of 
less than one, then sign Cov = sign U·(�): 
I'= oG51/as
1 • S1/Gs1 == S
1•Gs1s1/Gs1 > -1. (30) 
If equation (30) is true, then examining the derivatives of the two components 
of the covariance term in equation 27 with respect to u, 
a[u•GsiJ/au = G81• (1 + I'] > 0, 
and 
au•(w)/au = U"(w)•Pf•Gs1 ·S, 
(31) 
(32) 
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verifies that sign Cov - sign U•(w). That is, since the sign of equation 32 
is dependent on U•(w), and equation (31) is positive, sign Cov - sign U•(w). 
The above results lead to the second proposition: 
PROPOSITION II. When a firm engages in joinc produce crade under 
condicions of un.cercaincy, che risk averse (preferring) firm will engage in 
less (more) legal and illegal crade chan che risk neucral firm. 
To establish the above proposition, the result of sign Cov - sign U•(w) 
is applied to equations 26 and 27, and the following conditions are arrived at 
> z pS ' 
> 
<. 
pS 
depending on whether U•(w) 
' 
.c. 
7 
(33) 
(34) 
o. 
According to conditions 33 and 34, the marginal cost of producing the 
good to be used as legal and illegal inputs in joint product trade, (P8), is 
less than, equal to, or greater than the expected marginal revenue of the 
>· 
tradeable, be it legal or illegal as u• '2 0. This implies that the risk 
averse firm will engage in less legal and illegal trade than the risk neutral 
firm, and the risk neutral firm will engage in less legal and illegal trade 
than the risk preferring firm. This discussion establishes proposition II, 
given the conditions stated above. 
Proposition II leads to the next issue: a comparison of the demand for 
legal and illegal inputs by the risk neutral firm to the firm operating in a 
certainty environment. Equations 12 and 13 represent the firm's FOC under 
certainty. Equations 26 and 27 represent the firm's FOC under uncertainty. 
Now, our attention will focus on the marginal product terms found in those two 
sets of equations. Under the assumption that the third derivative of the 
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smuggling production function exists, the marginal product terms are defined 
as functions of L and S under the FOC for the certainty case as: 6 
and for the risk neutral firm operating under uncertainty, 
Equations 12a, 13a, 26a, and 27a leads to the third proposition, 
(12a) 
(13a) 
(26a) 
(27a) 
PROPOSITION III: A risk neutral firm will engage in less legal and illegal 
trade, ceteris paribus, than it would under conditions of certainty. 
To establish the third proposition, it is assumed that the marginal product 
functions defined in equations 26a and 27a, are (themselves) concave 
functions. Concavity implies that the second order total differentials of the 
marginal product functions are negative semidefinite. The economic 
consequences of the concavity assumption are: 1) the elasticities of the 
marginal product curves are non-increasing functions of factor inputs, 
on/oL � 0, and oi'/oS1 � 0; 7 (35) 
and 2) that legal and illegal inputs complement one another less and less as 
more of each input is employed in the production of a joint-product tradeable, 
(36) 
6 A certainty environment implies that the random variable u is replaced with its expected 
value, 0. One must also remember in eqs. 12a, 13a, 26a, and 27a, that pS represents the marginal 
cost of domestic production of the export good. 
7 The elasticity of the marginal product curve for legal trade in smuggling is defined as 
,, = L·GLL I GL. 
8 As noted by Ratti and Ullah, the concavity assumption imposed on the marginal product 
functions is consistent with many of the common forms of production functions used in economic 
analysis. 
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The concavity assumption allows a reapplication of Jensen's Inequality, 
E [GL(L,u•S)] < GL{L,u•S) 
and 
(37) 
{38) 
The implication of inequality 37 for eqs. 12a and 26a is that the risk neutral 
firm will engage in less legal trade than if the firm was operating in a world 
of certainty. The implication of inequality 38 for eqs. 13a and 27a is that 
the risk neutral firm will engage in less illegal trade than if the firm was 
operating in a world of certainty. Thus, proposition III is established. 
When smuggling incurs a real resource cost in the Pitt model, Pitt 
demonstrates that the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous. The 
introduction of uncertainty modifies Pitt's ambiguous welfare result derived 
under certainty. First, proposition I established that uncertainty reduces the 
ability of smugglers to transform ex-ante illegal goods into ex-post illegal 
goods, i. e. , the melting ice effect is magnified. Next, proposition Ill 
established that under uncertainty, a risk neutral firm will engage in less 
legal and illegal trade, than in a certainty environment. 
Propositions I & III indicate that total exports will decline when 
uncertainty is introduced. A decline in exports, implies a decline in imports 
and a shrinking of the country's trade triangle as compared to the certainty 
case presented by Pitt. Furthermore, the smuggler's transformation curve 
under uncertainty is inferior to the smuggler's transformation curve in a 
world of certainty. Therefore, the introduction of uncertainty causes a 
negative shift in the range of possible welfare levels presented by Pitt for 
his ambiguous welfare case, i. e. , the trade triangle shrinks under uncertainty 
as compared to a world of certainty. In other words, the introduction of 
13 
uncertainty has a negative welfare effect regardless of whether the welfare 
effect of smuggling under certainty was positive or negative. 9 Examining 
this last statement in the context of proposition II, if it is assumed that 
smugglers are risk averse, then the negative shift in the range of possible 
welfare levels is even greater than for the risk neutral case. 10 
Sheik (1989) contends that in the smuggling literature, the risk 
associated with smuggling is modelled incorrectly. He argues that an implicit 
assumption in the literature is that smugglers are risk preferring. The 
foregoing analysis provides an example that contradicts his conclusion. 
However, under the assumption of risk preferring smugglers, smuggling under 
uncertainty would expand as compared to smuggling under certainty. The 
consequence of assuming risk loving smugglers in the above model would be a 
positive shift in the range of possible welfare levels. 
With respect to Martin and Panagariya and other authors employing 
stochastic models of smuggling, their models are unable to make a distinction 
regarding the effect uncertainty has on smuggling behavior and welfare 
relative to smuggling in a world of certainty. The stochastic model of 
smuggling developed in this paper fills a void in the smuggling literature 
with respect to the effects uncertainty has on smuggling behavior and welfare 
as compared to a world of certainty. 
9 In Pitt's paper, figure No. 2 and his discussion on page 453 demonstrates that welfare levels 
are bounded by U5 and Up which indicates an ambiguous welfare result in his model. The 
introduction of uncertainty produces welfare levels bounded by E[U5J and E[Up]. Comparing 
welfare ranges between certainty and uncertainty, the first three propositions indicate that E[U5J 
< Us and E[Up] < Up. 
10 Sheikh (1989), notes that welfare under certainty is greater than welfare under uncertainty. 
However, he provides no formal proof. 
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VI. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS I: CHANGES IN THE WORLD PRICE, THE 
MARGINAL COST OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, AND TAXES 
In the next two sections it is assumed that the firm is risk neutral. 
The risk neutrality assumption is necessary in order to generate determinate 
results from the comparative static analysis. In order to analyze the affect 
of a change in the tax or world price of exports, the FOG, eqs. 18 and 19 are 
rewritten under the assumption of risk neutrality in the following manner, 
(39) 
(40) 
Invoking the implicit function theorem around the equilibrium values of 
L and S, and then taking the total differential of Z1 and Z2 leads to the 
fourth proposition: 
PROPOSITION IV. An increase in the export tax rate, ceteris paribus, 
will reduce the risk neutral smuggling firm's demand for legal and illegal 
inputs. The decline in demand will reduce joint-product exports. which in turn 
will cause a decline in imports and welfare. 
To establish proposition IV all of the differentials except dL, dS, and 
dt are set to zero. It is now possible to derive the partial derivatives, 
aL/at and as/at, 
aL/at - pf ·A2 I DET < 0 
as/at - -Pf ·B1 I DET < 0 
Equations 41 and 42 establish proposition IV for the risk neutral firm. 11 
They indicate that an increase in the tax rate will reduce the equilibrium 
(41) 
(42) 
level of demand for legal and illegal inputs. This result implies that the 
consequence of a rise in the tax rate is a decline in joint-product exports. 
Which leads to a decline in imports and welfare. 
11 The terms, A 1 , A2, 8 1 , and DET are defined by equations 20 through 23. 
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If all of the differentials except dL, dS, and dPf are set to zero, then 
we have proposition V. 
PROPOSITION V. An increase in che world price of exporcs, ceceris 
paribus, will increase che smuggling firm's demand for legal and illegal 
inpucs. The rise in demand will increase joinc-producc ex:porcs, which leads co 
an increase in che councry's imporcs and welfare. 
To establish proposition V all of the differentials except dL, dS, and 
dPf are set to zero. It is now possible to derive the partial derivatives, 
(43) 
Equations 43 and 44 establishes proposition V for the risk neutral firm. They 
indicate that a rise in the world price for exports will increase the 
equilibrium level of demand for legal and illegal inputs. This result implies 
that the consequence of a rise in the world price for exports is an increase 
in joint-product exports, leading to a rise in imports and welfare. 
If all of the differentials except dL, dS, and dP8 are set to zero, then 
we have proposition VI. 
PROPOSITION VI. An increase in che marginal cost for che domestic 
produccion of ex:porcs, ceteris paribus, will decrease che smuggling firm's 
demand for legal and illegal inputs. The decline in demand will decrease 
joinc-producc exporcs, which in cum will induce a decline in che councry's 
imporcs and welfare. 
To establish proposition VI all of the differentials except dL, dS, and 
dP8 are set to zero. It is now possible to derive the partial derivatives, 
oL/oP8 and as/oP8, 
oL/oP8 = A2 - B1 I DET < 0 
as;aps = A1 - B1 I DET < 0 
(45) 
(46) 
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Equations 45 and 46 establish proposition VI for the risk neutral firm. 
Equations 45 and 46 demonstrate that a rise in the marginal cost of domestic 
production of the good to be exported will decrease the equilibrium level of 
demand for legal and illegal inputs. This result implies that the consequence 
of a rise in the marginal cost of domestic production is a decline in joint-
product exports. Which leads to a decline in imports and welfare. 
VII. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS II: CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF 
ENFORCEMENT AND UNCERTAINTY 
A change in the level of enforcement or uncertainty implies a change in 
the moments of the random variable u, the smuggling success rate. Assume that 
the effect of an increase in anti-smuggling enforcement efficiency, implies a 
decline in the expected value of the smuggling success rate. This assumption 
leads to proposition VII, 
PROPOSITION VII. An increase in enforcement: act:ivit:y against: smuggling, 
cet:eris paribus, will decrease t:he risk neut:ral firm's demand for legal and 
illegal inputs. The decline in demand will decrease the country's joint­
product exports, leading to a decline in imports and welfare. 
To establish proposition VII a decline in the expected value of the 
smuggling success rate is analyzed by replacing u with u·- u+a in equations 39 
and 40. Then, differentiating with respect to 8, and evaluating the resulting 
changes in the demand for legal and illegal inputs at 9=0, produces equations 
47 and 48. 
A decline in 8 has the effect of shifting the probability distribution 
of u to the left and decreasing the expected value of the smuggling success 
rate for each level of legal and illegal inputs, without altering the shape of 
the probability distribution. The result of this distribution preserving 
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shift in the mean is only determinate for the risk neutral case and is 
presented below in eqs. 47 and 48. 
as;ae 
Proposition VII is established under the assumption that #>-1. This 
(47) 
(48) 
results in oL/o0 and as;ae both being positive. An implication of aL/o9 being 
positive, is that if enforcement activity against smuggling is increased, then 
export tax revenues will decline. 
Next, the effect of a marginal increase in uncertainty is considered. 
To capture the effect of a marginal change in uncertainty, the distribution of 
u will undergo a mean preserving change in the dispersion of the distribution. 
The results developed below are only determinant in the risk neutral case. A 
modification of equations 39 and 40 is now undertaken by replacing u with 
u*=(a•u + B), where a is a shift parameter and B is a function of a with the 
following properties: 
1) B' = -E[u] = -u, and 2) B(a=l) = 0. This transformation implies that S1 = 
(a•u + B)•S. This modification leads to the next proposition, 
PROPOSITION VIII. A mean preserving increase in uncertainty over how 
successful smuggling will be, ceteris paribus, will decrease the smuggling 
firm's demand for legal and illegal inputs. The decline in demand will 
decrease the country's joint-product exports, generating a decline in imports 
and welfare. 
To establish proposition VIII, it assumed the firm is risk neutral. 
Differentiating the transformed equations 39 and 40 with respect to a and 
evaluating oL/oa and oS/aa at a=l, yields 
(49) 
and 
(50) 
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The signs of the partial derivatives derived above can be determined by 
examining the following relationships: 
E[S• G181• (u-u)] - Cov [S• G181, (u-u)] 
and 
E[G51 • (l+') • (u-u)) = Cov [G51 • (l+'), (u-u)). 
By ascertaining the signs of the above covariance terms, the signs of the 
numerators in eqs. 49 and SO can be determined. 
Examining the derivatives of the three components of the covariance 
terms in eqs. 51 and 52 with respect to u yields, 
8S• G181/ou < 0, 
d (u-u)/ du - 1 > 0, 
and 
0 Gs1• (l+')/ou < 0. 
(51) 
(52) 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
Under the concavity assumption imposed on the smuggling production 
function and the marginal product functions discussed earlier, the signs of 
the covariance terms are negative. Negative covariance terms yield negative 
signs for the partial derivatives, oL/oa < 0 and as;aa < 0, and establishes 
proposition VIII. 
The comparative static analysis of a change in enforcement or 
uncertainty in this section was performed using the modelling techniques 
developed in the "competitive firm under uncertainty" literature. An analysis 
of the effect of increased uncertainty on smuggling behavior or increased 
enforcement's effect on the average rate of successful smuggling reveals that 
in a joint product model, legal and illegal trade decline. Therefore, welfare 
will decline as enforcement efficiency or uncertainty increase. The 
stochastic model developed in this paper makes a contribution by providing 
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insight into how enforcement and uncertainty effect the smuggling firm's input 
demand and joint-product (output supply) production decisions. 
IX. A BRIBERY MODEL OF JOINT PRODUCT SMUGGLING 
The real resource cost associated with smuggling was defined in equation 
14 as being equal to s1-s*. Assume that bribes replace cloaking activities 
as the source of the "melting ice effect", the difference between S1-s* . 12 
If bribery payments are consider to be just an income transfer, then the 
melting ice effect is rendered welfare neutral. 
The substitution of bribery for cloaking activities in the certainty 
model presented earlier generates Pitt's strictly positive welfare effect for 
smuggling as compared to non-smuggling. However, the introduction of 
uncertainty in section IV, demonstrates that the mere presence of uncertainty 
will reduce the positive welfare effect of smuggling as compared to smuggling 
in a world of certainty. The implication of introducing uncertainty is that 
the smuggler's bribery cost increases as compared to smuggling in a world of 
certainty. 
X. SUMMARY. 
A stochastic model of joint-product smuggling was presented in this 
paper. The stochastic modeling approach used in this paper extends the 
microeconomic foundation of the smuggling literature by merging it with the 
literature on firm behavior under uncertainty. 
The stochastic model developed in this paper extends the crime-theoretic 
approach to smuggling introduced by Martin and Panagariya. The model uses 
12 Martin and Panagariya, and Sheikh both discuss the issue of bribery being used as a tool 
by smugglers. 
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enforcement as the activity which introduces uncertainty in the smuggler's 
production function. This allowed the modeling techniques developed in the 
"competitive firm under uncertainty" literature to be used to analyze 
smuggling under uncertainty for the first time. 
The welfare and trade pattern implications of the preceding analysis 
provides marginal support for Bhagwati and Hansen's policy conclusion of the 
"less smuggling the better". The level of support is marginal because the 
very presence of uncertainty reduces welfare when compared to smuggling in a 
world of certainty. 
21 
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
Production Uncertainty , Enforcement and 
Smuggling : A Stochastic Model 
1. Another way to state Eq. 16 would be : 
E [ G ( L, S1 ) ]  < G ( L, E[S1] )  
where E[S1] • a·s 
2. First order conditions, equations 18 and 19 : 
EQ. 18 . 
where d U ( n ) = U' ( n ) dn 
EQ. 19 a E [ U ( ,i; ) ] = ,J dU ( n ) • an ] as -l dn as 
where dU ( n ) = U' ( n ) , and dn 
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3. Second order conditions 
For equation 21 
A,i = c32 E
[ U( n ) ] = J da U(1t )  01t + c321t • dU( 1t ) ) as2 ""l d11:2 as as2 dx 
Under the assumption of u•s 0, A1 and A2 are both negative. 'When U• > 0 
it is  assumed A1 and A2 are negative. 
For equation 22 
Bi 
= a2 E  [ U ( n ) ] = J d::i U(1t )  � + 
dLaS "'l d7'2 oL 
a2 n  • dU ( x )  
J aLas d11: 
Taylor ' s  Theorem states that 
a2 B [ U ( n ) ] = c32 B [ U ( ff ) ] 
a Las asaL 
Impos ing the second order conditions, we have equation 23. 
4. Equations 24 and 25 are just equations 18  and 19 rearranged. 
Equations 26 and 27 are written according to Horowitz, p .  364-367. Us ing 
the following definition E (xy) - E(x) • E(y) + COV(X, Y) , equations 24 and 25 
are transformed in equations 26 and 27. Remember that S1 - u • S  
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For equation 28 
a u' (11: > = du' < n >  cm dS
1 
au dff as1 du 
de/ ( 11: ) = U" ( ff )  
dn 
cm A dS
1 = 
p r - G
si du 
= S 
as 1 
au' C n )  .. 
au 
= U" (11: ) • p i ·S·GsJ 
The sign of EQ . 28 is the same as U· (�) 
For equation 29  
a [ GL + ( l - t) ] dSl 
as 1 • du 
The s ign of Eq . 2 9  is positive , thus sign COV - Sign U• (w) in Eq . 26 . 
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For equat ion 31 
G.i • ( 1 + E)  > 0 
where u • S S 1 and by EQ. 30, equation 31 is positive if E > - 1 .  
Equation 32 is identical to Eq . 28. Therefore, the sign of Eq . 32 is 
the same as U· (�) .  The sign of Eq. 31 is positive. Thus, SIGN COV - SIGN 
U· (�) in Eq. 27. 
5 .  The elasticity of the marginal product curve of legal trade is defined as 
6. The assumptions imposed in eqs. 35 and 36 are consistent with the 
assumption that the marginal product functions are concave. 
For equation 35 
at: = [ 51 • G,1,i.1 + G.,i,11 • G,i - 51 [ G,uil a < 0 
asi £ G.1 J z 
Concavi ty assumption - G11i,i.i < o ,  /\ i t  assures tha t ..E!._ < O .  as 1 
Concavi ty assumption - Gr.u. < O /\ i t  assures tha t -£t < 0 
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For equation 36 
The Hess ian matrices for the marginal produc t functions of legal and 
illegal trade are negative semidefinite if  the conditions given in Eqs . 35  and 
36 hold.  
Legal Trade 
!ff� > 0 
Illegal Trade 
2 7  
Total differentials of Eqs . 39  and 40 . The total differentials for Z1 
and Z2 are written under the assumption of risk neutrality .  Thus , the FOC are 
no longer written in terms of utility .  
dZ1 : E [P
r ·Gu. · dL + p r · u · Gz..i · dS] • 
- E [ Gz. • dp
r + ( 1 - t) ·dP r + p r ·Gu1 ·S·du - p
r· dt - dP •] 
dZa : E [P
r · G.1z. · u · dL + p
r · u 2 · G.u1 · dS] = 
- E [ u  · G.1 • dP
r + p r · G.1 · du + p
r · u · G.1•1 • S · du - dP •] 
where du can be rewri t ten in the fol l  owing manner 
- E [P r • G.1 • ( 1  + £ ) ] dU 
The Hess ian matrix under risk neutral ity 
IA! = DET A >  0 
Comparative static analys is will employ Cramer ' s  rule . 
Eqs . 41 and 42 , the effect of  a change in the export tax rate on L ,  S .  
aL 
at 
A ·  as 
at 
aL 
at 
p r • ll 
= ·-a < 0 
DET 
as 
at 
-p r . B1 = < O  
DET 
Eqs . 43 , 44 , the effect of a change in the world price of  exports on L ,  S .  
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A ·  
a
L 
l 
0p r • 1
- B ( G£ + ( 1 - t) ] ] 
as - B C u · G..:l 
ap r 
as 
ap r 
A1 • [ -E[ u • G.1) ]  - B1 ( -E (G£ + ( 1 - t) ] ]  > O  
DET 
Eqs . 45 -46 , the effect of a change in the marginal cost of domestic produc t 
for the good to be exported . 
A ·  . [�] 
Eqs . 47 -48 , examine the effect of a distribution persevering shift of  
the mean , i . e . , a change in  enforcement effort . 
iJ0 -E[P
r · Gui •S] 
[ aL 
A .  : • [- E [ P '  · G_, • ( 1 + 1 ) ] ] 
An increase in 0 implies a decrease in enforcement effic iency . Thus , 
the firm ' s demand for legal and illegal inputs will increase .  The comparative 
status are set forth in Equations 47 , 48 . 
iJL _ - E ( P r • Gui • S] • � - B1 • [ - E [P
r ' G •l • ( 1 + � ) ] > O 00 - DET 
29  
as _ - E{P" ' G•l ' ( 1  +e} ] ' Ai  - Bi · [ - E[P" • Gul • S] ]  
a6 
-
DET > 0 
An increase in a implies an increase in uncertainty . An increase in 
uncertainty will decrease the firm ' s demand for legal and illegal inputs . The 
comparative static results are set forth in Equations 49 , 50 . [ aL
] aii - P "E[G  • ( u -0} • S] A Ul . as = - P "E[G • [1 +c] • ( u -a) J - •l acs 
aL = - P "E [ Gul • ( u - 0} · SJ • A;i  - [-P 1'E[G8J • ( 1 + 1 )  • ( u -0) ] · Bi 
iJcs DET 
as Ai '  [ - P 1
'
E[G81 ' ( l +c )  • ( u -0} ] - [ -P"E [Gu1 • ( u - 0) • SJ • Bi 
acs DET 
The DET in Eqs . 49 , 50 , are pos itive thus , the s igns of the partial 
derivatives aL/oa , as;aa are dependent on the signs of the numerators . 
The s igns of the partial derivatives derived above can be determined by 
examining the following relationships . 
The s ign of Eqs . 49 and 50 are dependent on the numerators , s ince the 
denominator is positive . The key to s igning the numerators is the following 
relationship : E (X •Y) - E (X) • E (Y) + COV(X , Y) . Rewriting equations 49 and 50 , 
we have , 
49a . E [ GLai • S • (u-u) ] - E [ S • GLa � ] · E [u-u ]  + COV [ S · Gtai , (u-u) ] 
50a . E [ G,1 · ( l+e ) • (u-u) - E [ G.1 • ( l+e ) ]  • E [u -u ]  + COV [ G.i • ( l+E ) ,  (u-u) ] 
However , E [u-u ] - 0 ,  so equations 49a and 50a reduce to eqs . 51 and 5 2 .  
51 . E [ GLa1 · S • (u-u) ] - COV [ S • GLal •  (u -0.) ] 
By ascertaining the s igns of the covariance terms in equations 51  and 
5 2 ,  the s igns of the numerators in equations 49 and 50 can be determined . 
Examining the derivatives of the two components of the covariance terms 
with respect to u ,  will allow us to determine the s igns of the covariance 
terms in eqs.� and -::ea. 
5i  5 1  
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Remembering that S 1 - (a •u  + B) • S ,  and 
dS1 = 11 •S  A S1 = u •  • S , we have 
du 
o [S • Guu l 
au 
= S • [ oGu1. dS1] 
as1 du 
d [ u - a] = 1 > O ,  therefore COV [S · Gu1 , ( u - Q) ] < O  du 
The derivative of the other covariance term with respect to u is now 
analyzed below . 
o [G81 
aa.1 
as1 
• (l + e ) ] a ca.1 
au 
dS l  
du 
dS1 
+ du Gsis1. + 
+ Gs1.s1 
au 
aa.1a1 
as1 
. 91 )  
dS 1 9 1 = 
du 
d C u -Q) = 1 > o ,  therefore cov[Gs1 • (1 + e ) , ( u -Q) ] < o .  du 
The above results demonstrate that the numerators in eqs . 49 and SO are 
negative and thus we have the following results , 
oS < 0 and oL < 0 • a« a« 
3 1  
